Controversy Over the 40-Year-Old Kori Unit 2 Reactor’s Life Extension – Was Political Judgment Prioritized Over Safety?

As of November 21, 2025, the debate surrounding domestic nuclear power policy is intense. On November 13, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission approved the extension of Kori Unit 2’s lifespan, raising fundamental questions about the safety and economic viability of aging nuclear reactors over 40 years old. An interview with Park Jong-kwon, representative of the Anti-Nuclear Citizens’ Action in Gyeongnam, casts doubt on whether this decision was reasonable.

Kori Unit 2 is a small 650MW nuclear power plant that began operations in 1983, making it the second oldest commercial nuclear plant in Korea. After surpassing its 40-year operational permit in April 2023, it was shut down but will now continue to operate until April 2033 following the recent review by the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission. However, several issues that emerged during this process appear to be serious.

The most notable issue is the low power contribution of Kori Unit 2. According to Park, it has produced an average of 3.1 billion kWh annually over the past four years, which accounts for only 0.5% of the total domestic power production of 595.6 billion kWh in 2024. More astonishingly, Samsung Electronics alone consumes 26 billion kWh annually, more than eight times the output of Kori Unit 2. Given this proportion, one might question whether it was necessary to extend its lifespan despite safety controversies.

More concerning is the unstable operation rate of Kori Unit 2. Being a 42-year-old aging reactor, its operation rate averages only 54%, significantly lower than the national average of 83% for all 26 reactors. The annual production variance—2 billion kWh in 2020, 5.5 billion kWh in 2021, 3.6 billion kWh in 2022, and 1.5 billion kWh in 2023—suggests frequent malfunctions. Park’s analogy that “a car that is 40 years old often breaks down and stops running” seems apt.

Hasty Review and Political Judgment

The life extension process was fraught with issues. The application for extension was supposed to be submitted by April 2021, two years before expiration, but was not due to the Moon Jae-in administration’s nuclear phase-out policy. It was only submitted belatedly in April 2022, a month after President Yoon Suk-yeol’s election, indicating political judgment had already intervened.

The Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) conducted a safety review over three years and four months, but the final decision process by the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission was rushed. The first review on September 25 was postponed due to insufficient review time, and the second review on October 23 was postponed due to requests for additional data. Despite one of the six members opposing the decision due to inadequate safety assurances, the extension was approved by a 5-to-1 majority on November 13.

Particularly problematic was that three of the nine commission members, who were technical experts, were at the end of their terms. It would have been sensible to replenish the expert members before proceeding with the review, but non-expert members led the decision. Handling such a critical issue affecting the safety of 3 million citizens in the Busan-Gyeongnam area in such a hurried manner reflects a lack of safety awareness.

The reasons for the haste by Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power and the commission are clear. Within the next five years, the operational licenses of 10 reactors, including Kori Units 3 and 4, Wolsong Units 2, 3, and 4, and Hanbit Units 1 and 2, will expire. It seems they intended to use Kori Unit 2 as a precedent to smoothly extend the lifespans of the remaining reactors. In other words, it was a political judgment aimed at maintaining consistency in overall nuclear policy rather than focusing on the safety of individual reactors.

The Illusion of Nuclear Power’s Economic Viability

Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power argues that electricity rates will increase without life extensions, but this stems from a misunderstanding of nuclear power’s economic viability. As Park pointed out, while nuclear power has been claimed to be the cheapest, international assessments indicate it is the most expensive when considering waste disposal and accident insurance costs.

According to levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) analyses by energy organizations such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), Lazard, and the Korea Environmental Policy Institute, nuclear power is the most expensive, followed by coal, with solar and wind being the cheapest. As of 2025, global renewable energy costs continue to decline, whereas nuclear costs are on the rise.

The issue of nuclear accident insurance is particularly severe. Currently, nuclear plants are insured for only 1/1000 of the expected damage amount, making insurance coverage impossible in the event of an accident. Proper insurance would increase the generation cost by an estimated 2.5 times. Considering the Fukushima nuclear disaster’s recovery costs exceeded 200 trillion won, the true cost of nuclear power is evident.

Additionally, the issue of nuclear waste disposal remains unresolved. With no permanent disposal site for high-level nuclear waste in Korea, continuing to produce nuclear waste burdens future generations. This is why Park emphasizes, “We must not pass the burden of nuclear waste disposal onto future generations.”

In contrast, renewable energy is rapidly advancing. As of 2025, domestic solar power costs have fallen to 60-80 won per kWh, and offshore wind costs continue to decrease due to technological advancements and economies of scale. While the government argues for nuclear expansion citing increased power demand from AI and data centers, Park’s criticism of “inflated demand” seems persuasive.

In fact, global tech giants like Google, Microsoft, and Amazon have pledged to supply their data centers with 100% renewable energy to achieve ESG management and carbon neutrality goals. As domestic companies increasingly join the RE100 (Renewable Energy 100%) initiative, increasing nuclear dependency contradicts the global trend.

Ultimately, the decision to extend Kori Unit 2’s lifespan appears problematic in terms of both safety and economic viability. Instead of risking another 10 years of operation for an aging reactor contributing only 0.5% of total power production, it would have been more rational to invest those resources in expanding renewable energy. Especially in the Busan-Gyeongnam region, already known as the “world’s largest nuclear-concentrated area,” this decision adds further risk.

With 10 more reactors set to undergo life extension reviews, Kori Unit 2 should not set a precedent. Each reactor’s safety and economic viability must be rigorously evaluated, and life extensions should be cautiously decided only when truly necessary. Above all, a transparent and democratic decision-making process prioritizing citizen safety is essential.

This article was written after reading an OhmyNews article, with personal opinions and analysis added.

Disclaimer: This blog is not a news outlet, and the content reflects the author’s personal views. The responsibility for investment decisions lies with the investor, and no liability is assumed for investment losses based on this article.